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A substantial majority of scholars and international
lawyers who have addressed the legality of post1967 Israel settlements on the West Bank have
found them to be illegal.1 Diplomatic practice of states and pronouncements
of international organizations reflect a similar near-consensus. Yet the fact
remains that the settlements exist and do not appear likely to disappear soon.
As settlements expand and as transportation and security infrastructures
expand to support them, further land is rendered inaccessible to Palestinians,
making an independent contiguous Palestine impossible and a two-state
solution hard to imagine.

What Law Applies?
The international law that most directly affects the legality of West Bank
settlements includes international conventions, the customary international
law that might flow from these treaties2, applicable United Nations Security
Council resolutions, and the jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ or World Court).
Treaty law traditionally only obligates and benefits state parties to a
treaty. It is an explicit written agreement between two or more states. If a
state is not a party, it cannot assert rights under it. Nor can it be bound by its
provisions. Generally, only a state can be a party to a treaty. Such analysis
mirrors the logic of contract law found in most legal systems. Thus, Palestine
could only complain under treaty law about Israeli settlement activity, if
1 This essay addresses an interdisciplinary audience of politicians, Mideast experts, human rights
activists, journalists, etc. It does not attempt to repeat the very thorough doctrinal analysis found
in law journals and comprehensive texts by Theodor Meron, Gershom Gorenberg, and others. I
draw on and acknowledge their scholarship in enabling me to create this overview intended for
a mixed, non-law audience. Of course, any conclusions or opinions herein are mine, not theirs.
2 For purposes of this article, the terms “treaty” and “convention” are synonymous. Generally, a
convention refers to an important multilateral treaty, often with a quasi-legislative effect.
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Palestine and Israel were both state parties to the treaty purportedly being
violated.
However, in the last 75 years, with the growth of international human
rights law, numerous multilateral international conventions have departed
under the ergo omnes doctrine from this contract model. Such treaties
operate not merely for the reciprocal benefit of state parties, but for the
benefit of all humanity. Thus, for example, becoming a state party to a
convention prohibiting torture not only obligates that state to other parties
but also obligates it to all persons. It may not torture nationals of other state
parties, but such a treaty also prohibits it from torturing its own nationals,
or nationals of a non-party state, or stateless persons. Many human rights
conventions today operate ergo omnes, and some are relevant to the question
of the settlements. Again, however, if Israel is not party to a particular treaty,
how could it be bound by its provisions? The question engages the interplay
between treaty law and international customary law.
The United Nations Charter, the 1907 Convention (No. IV) Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), the 1949 Convention
(No. IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Geneva IV) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)3are the conventions that appear most relevant to issues surrounding
the settlements.4
International customary law binds all states. Lawyers find custom by
identifying uniform practice among states, as well as a consensus {opinio
3 A state may limit its treaty obligations by reservations and derogations. In Israel’s case, it has
joined the International Convention on Civil and Political with a reservation that preserved its
right to have religious law control in family and spiritual matters. More to our point, Israel has
derogated from a number of the ICCPR’s protections of civil rights, by declaring an ongoing state
of emergency under ICCPR Article 4 which allows limited derogations from civil rights obligations
in times of existential emergency.
The UN Charter probably ranks first in importance among treaties, given its scope and its universal
acceptance by states. Article 2(4) of the Charter outlaws the use of force in international relations.
The illegality of permanent territorial conquest by war flows from that prohibition. Thus, Israel’s
annexation of the Golan Heights after the 1967 war with Syria broke the very fundamental
mandate of Article 2(4). Netanyahu’s claim that the annexation was justified by the doctrine of
conquest-by-defensive-war fails on one or possibly two grounds. First, by 1967 Israel had long
been a party to the UN Charter and bound by Article 2(4), a provision that “occupies the field” in
matters of the international use of force by states. Exceptions to its near-absolute prohibition may
not be assumed. Exceptions are limited to immediate self-defense under Article 51 (which offers
no additional allowance for permanent conquest), participation in Security Council police actions,
and perhaps (according to some authorities) humanitarian intervention. Second, it is a matter of
profound debate whether Israel’s 1967 War with Syria was one of self-defense. Trump’s recent
proclamation regarding the Golan did not change the illegality of the annexation, but perhaps
made him an accomplice after-the-fact in it. While these issues do not directly speak to the twostate solution regarding Palestine, they do reflect on the Netanyahu and Trump administrations’
reliability as negotiating partners.
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juris) that such practice is legally required. Often people disagree regarding
the existence of a custom, since it is an unwritten norm.
When treaty provisions are so widely accepted by the international
community that they reflect general state practice, as well as the consensus
opinion of policymakers and legal scholars, such treaty law is deemed
custom binding all nations. So, when the overwhelming majority of nations
adhere to treaties like the Geneva Conventions, when they are widely
incorporated into domestic law, when their norms are frequently cited as
rules for proper behavior, judges and experts may consider such treaty
rules to be customary rules, binding all states — not just state parties.
Furthermore, such customary rules may apply to situations outside the
procedural requirements of the convention from which they spring.
A UN Security Council resolution is a legally binding order issued by
the Council based on the authority granted to it by the UN Charter5, itself
a treaty agreed to by virtually every state in the world. Citing international
law generally and Geneva IV in particular, on December 23, 2016 the
Security Council demanded in Resolution 2334 “that Israel immediately
and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian
territories.”
Jurisprudence of the International Court o f Justice includes 1)
decisions in contentious cases between states which usually contain legal
orders binding on parties to that case, and 2) advisory opinions requested
by the UN Security Council or General Assembly, which carry significant
interpretive authority but are not legally binding orders to any state or
individual. There has been no case before the World Court to which Israel
and Palestine have been parties. However, the court did address the legality
of the West Bank settlements in the Palestine Wall Advisory Opinion.6 It
found them to violate international law. However, since this was not the
specific question asked of the court by the General Assembly, it was not
analyzed in detail but only addressed in conclusory terms. While this was
not a legally binding order to abandon the settlements, it was a conclusion
5 By contrast, UN General Assembly resolutions do not create binding law. The General Assembly
is not an international legislature. It does not proportionally represent humanity. Tiny San Marino
has the same single vote as India with its billion people. However, when it acts with consensus,
representing all segments o f the world's population, GA resolutions, while not law per se,
constitute evidence of state practice and legal opinion, thus of custom. This is particularly true
where authoritative international bodies, such as the Security Council and the World Court (as
well as most states) reaffirm the position of the General Assembly in word and deed. At its birth,
Israel benefited from such a process, where the 1947 Partition Plan authorized Jewish and Arab
states in previously British Palestine, and where subsequent Security Council affirmation and state
practice confirmed Israel’s existence.
« International Court o f Justice (ICJ): Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory 43 I.L.M. 1009 Advisory Opinion 1 162 (July 9, 2004)
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of illegality from a highly respected tribunal.
While a number of sources of law mentioned above affect the legality
of Israeli settlements on the West Bank, this essay’s ten pages do not permit
detailed consideration of them all — the UN Charter, the Human Rights
Covenants, Security Council resolutions, court opinions, etc. The language
o f the Hague and Geneva Conventions, whether applied directly as treaty
obligations or derivatively as customary law, most directly controls the
analysis here. It is codified international law that specifically speaks to the
case of an occupying power settling its own nationals in occupied territory.

Applying the Law
Hague IV contains the following provisions that pertain here:
Article 46 2):
Private property cannot be confiscated.
Article 55:
The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary
of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the
hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital
of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.
Article 56 1):
The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity
and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated
as private property.
All seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this character,
historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden.

Palestine is a party to Hague IV, but Israel is not. Therefore, the
convention does not bind Israel directly as a matter of treaty law. However, as
discussed above, provisions of a treaty may reflect international customary
law, when they are widely accepted as such by legal authorities. The world
has so accepted Hague IV. The Nuremberg Tribunals7 and the Israeli
Supreme Court have joined in that consensus. Furthermore, the Israeli
Supreme Court has said in the Beit Sourik case, “the Regulations Concerning
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 ...
reflect customary international law.”8 Thus, where West Bank settlements
have been built on private Arab land, they violate Article 46. Where built
on public land, they violate Article 55. Where built on municipal, religious
or educational property, they violate Article 56.
7 Nuremberg Tribunals, September 30 & October 1, 1946.
8 See Ajuri v. l.D.F Commander HCJ 7015/02, Judgment of President A. Barak, 13 (Sept 3, 2002)
concluding that the Fourth Geneva and Hague Conventions are customary law.
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Geneva IV contains the following provisions that control here:
Article 49 1)
forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country,
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.
Article 49 6)
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian
population into the territory it occupies.

Israel has both displaced Palestinians from their homes and transferred
Israelis to settlements.
Israel and Palestine are both parties to Geneva IV. However, some
Israeli lawyers and politicians have propounded the disputed territory
theory to avoid the designation of the lands conquered in 1967 as “occupied”
and thereby subject to Geneva. Were this logic correct, Israel would not be an
occupier under Geneva IV and thus not bound by its rules. So, the argument
goes, since Jordan occupied the West Bank in 1948 (after Britain had
surrendered its mandate over Palestine) and because it was not authorized to
so occupy that land, the territory continued to be in a non-sovereign limbo,
and Israel’s conquest was not illegal or even an occupation.
However, Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law o f

The International Court o f Justice, which has its seat in The Hague, is the principal
judicial organ o f the United Nations
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Treaties' reads: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in light of its object and purpose” (emphasis added). The
ordinary meaning of both Hague and Geneva, quoted above, outlaw
settlement activity and its ancillary acts. The very apparent “object and
purpose” of the quoted provisions — to protect civilians in a conflict zone
- can only be met by prohibiting such activity. Arguments over technical
sovereignty do not trump the basic purpose of protecting the civilian
residents of the territory.
Law eschews an interpretation of a treaty that leaves a gap in addressing
a principal purpose of that treaty. Thus, in another Geneva Convention case^
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that habeas
petitioner Hamdan was entitled to Geneva Common Article 3 protection,
rejecting the Bush administration’s argument that he was not a protected
enemy soldier under the general provisions of the Convention, but neither
was he covered by safety-net Article 3, since it referred to conflicts “not of
an international character.” The Court rightly refused to find such a gap that
would allow torture and other denial of rights, in a provision that clearly was
meant to cover all those armed conflicts that the major interstate provisions
of the treaty did not. Analogously, Geneva IV is intended to cover the rights
ot civilians (here Palestinians) when their land is conquered in modem
conflict. An interpretation that so narrowed the word “occupation” as to strip
the intended protection of the law runs contrary to the purpose of the treaty.
Hague IV and Geneva IV codify customary law. Furthermore, they
have the status of ergo omnes treaties — creating rights not just for parties,
but foi all humanity. They bind and protect the world community, as a
national statute binds and protects all persons within a state. These particular
provisions regulate the precise situation at hand — the rights of civilians
whose territory has been occupied by a foreign military. Pronouncements
ot the Security Council10, the World Court" and other bodies finding the
settlements illegal flow essentially from these Hague and Geneva rules.
Is the Jew ish Q uarter an Illegal Settlem ent?
As to the West Bank and as to the overwhelmingly Arab neighborhoods
ot East Jerusalem, the rules of treaty construction and the ergo omnes
character of the Hague and Geneva Conventions mandate that those
teiritories are occupied ’ and that Israeli settlements within them violate
1155 U.N.T.S. 331. The Vienna Convention is taken by most experts to codify customary law of
treaty interpretation.
10 Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016)
11 See footnote 5
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international law. The Jewish Quarter of the Old City presents a different
situation.
For centuries, Jews resided in the southeast quarter of the old walled
city. For less than two decades, after the Jordan Legion conqueied and
largely demolished that quarter in the 1948-49 war, the neighborhood was
largely abandoned, save a small number of poor Arabs that Jordan settled
among the ruins. Thus, the question, “Whom does Hague IV and Geneva
IV aim to protect?” prompts a different answer here than with regard to
East Jerusalem outside the walled city. While the latter neighborhoods
were historically Arab for hundreds of years prior to 1967 (and therefore
under the logic of this article are occupied and not legally open to Israeli
settlement), the Jewish Quarter is a different matter.
The resettlement of the Jewish Quarter by Jews was a reclamation
of a traditionally Jewish neighborhood semi-abandoned since the Jews’
expulsion less than two decades earlier; it was not occupation of and
settlement within historically and predominately Arab territory, as has been
the case in the West Bank and the rest of East Jerusalem. Thus, in this very
limited situation (compared to the Occupation as a whole) neither Hague
IV or Geneva IV are implicated.

Why Does Law Matter?
Law affects the bargaining positions of the parties. Violations of
these laws are precisely what make a territorially viable Palestinian state
impossible. Law impacts third-party mediating leverage, for example, U.S.
and European pressure on the Israelis. Important constituencies within such
countries care about upholding the rule of law. Law might also bolster the
positions of groups within Israel, particularly pro-peace factions and the
weight their arguments carry with the Israeli public. All this might affect
the political chances for a two-state solution.
Finally, once the parties conclude a peace agreement, its fidelity to
international norms of justice will make more likely the buy-in of as many
stakeholders as possible.
So, it matters whether the settlements are legal or illegal under
international law. Generally, they are illegal. Negotiations should proceed
accordingly.12
12 This is not to say that the burden of negotiating “give” is totally on Israeli shoulders. On issues
that include Hamas targeting civilians, institutionalized anti-Semitism and incitement, and
acknowledgment of the finality of 1948, Palestinian “give” is also required. But one suspects that
reversal of Israeli settlement policy would shake loose the psycho-political logjam on some of
these other issues.
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